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• Tutorial E Part 1:
– Section 1: Cyber Threat – Who, What and Why
– Section 2: Defense-In-Depth
– Section 3: Secure Software Engineering Steps
– Section 4: Errors, Weaknesses and Exploits
– Section 5: Threat Modeling
– Section 6: Testing
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• Tutorial E Part 2:
– Section 1: Ground Systems Overview
– Section 2: Secure Software Development
– Section 3: Defense in Depth for Ground Systems
– Section 4: What Now?
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Defining “Ground Systems”
3
Spacecraft Ground Systems encompasses the
entire system, beginning with issuing the
command from the MOC up until it emits from the
antenna to the reception of radio signals down at
the antenna to displaying telemetry on the MOC
computer
Scope…
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• Tutorial will focus on the software developed
for the
• Mission Operations Center (MOC)
• Mission planning area
• Software development environment
TLM 
Archive
Threats for Space Missions
5
SECURITY THREATS AGAINST SPACE 
MISSIONS
CCSDS 350.1-G-1
March 2015
CCSDS was founded in 1982 by the major space agencies of the world, the CCSDS is a multi-
national forum for the development of communications and data systems standards for 
spaceflight. 60+ standards published serving 500+ missions
Security Threats Against Space 
Missions was developed to provide 
mission planners with an overview on 
threat assessment as well as the 
common threats and threat sources 
that exist for various categories of 
civilian space missions.
Threats for Space Missions
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Threats in Space
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Applicable Threats to Space Missions Impacts Could Software Be Involved?
Data Corruption  Modification of information
 System damage
Yes; SW attacks could result in data corruption
Ground Facility Physical Attack Loss of command, control and data No
Interception Loss of sensitive data No
Jamming  Loss of Command telemetry link
 Loss of access to resources
No
Denial-of-Service Loss of access to resources Yes; SW DoS attacks are common and can affect 
both ground, flight and web applications
Masquerade  Potential to disrupt operations (uplink)
 Potential to receive false information 
(downlink)
Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent
Replay System damage (possible safety of life issues) Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent
Software threats  Undesirable events
 System damage
 Enable other threats (i.e. Jamming, DoS)
Yes
Unauthorized Access  Disruption of operations
 System damage (possible safety of life 
issues)
Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent or 
SW can be used to gain unauthorized access
Tainted Hardware Components  Hidden, Malicious capabilities
 System instability
 System damage
 Undesirable System effects
No
Cybersecurity in the space domain 
Isn’t ONLY an IT function 
Security is a part of Mission Success
o Web sites/servers, email, 
workstation patching, etc.
o CIO infrastructure focused
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o Mission Targets / Enterprise Risk
• Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)
• Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.)
• Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, 
Continuous Monitoring, etc.)
• Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
• Supply Chain…
o Multiple stakeholders (CIOs, Network Engrs, SW 
Developers, Project Managers, etc.)
Must counteract the threat 
landscape for Mission environments 
with Defense in Depth
Custom SW – Gets Exploited!
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Multiple vulnerabilities could adversely impact Mission Operations 
(Architecture, SW, IT, etc.)
o Preventing vulnerabilities
– Levying requirements from the top in policy, contracts, etc.
• PPPs, A&A process, SW development, etc.
– During mission design/planning
• Designing security in
• Secure software development
• Rigorous mission assurance (SW Assurance, IV&V, etc.)
• Awareness, training, tooling
– Supply chain – know the parts you are building with…
• Hardware
• Software (i.e. COTS and Open Source)
o Discovering vulnerabilities
– Once vulnerabilities are introduced into operation – then what?
• Continuous monitoring
• Vulnerability assessments
• Penetration testing 
Reducing SW Risk
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Requirements…
• Examples of requirements government agencies may invoke
– DOD
• Program Protection & System Security Engineering
– NASA
• NPRs 2810 , 7150.2B, 7120.5E, and the SW Assurance 
Standard/Handbook (under draft)
– NIST 800-53
• Example control for SW: 
– SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation 
– RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning
– European Space Agency (ESA) - (under draft)
• ESSB-ST-E-008 - Secure Software Engineering Std
• ESSB-HB-E-007 – Secure Software Engineering Handbook
• Other resources to help identify requirements
– Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE)
– Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle
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Not Baking in Security
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• Traditional cost of change curve depicts how 
discovering defects last impacts cost
“Bake It In”
If Bug=Exploited
damage could be 
more than monetary
Loss of Mission Obj(s)
Loss of Mission
Loss of Life
Secure software 
development begins 
where all software 
begins!
Baking It In
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Secure software is an 
end-to-end development 
concept, not patchwork
Secure Development
• Utilize Best Practices
– List is from NASA’s Secure Coding Portal 
• Coding Standards (Ex. CERT C, C++ or JAVA Stds)
– Ex: Don’t use unsafe functions (Flawfinder)
• Integrate tools into development environment
– Code Analyzers (i.e. Klockwork, Fortify, Flexelint, 
CodeSonar, Sonatype, BlackDuck, etc.)
– Great resource for identifying tools 
• Report | Spreadsheet
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Applies to all SW 
development!! 
Not just ground 
systems
Secure Development (cont.)
• Use information from DHS:
– Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE),  Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVE), and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification (CAPEC)
– Plan for Defense in Depth and not solely on protective perimeter
• Historically developers depend/plan for Firewalls to protect vice designing 
in SW
• Securing the development environment (i.e. prevent injecting of malicious 
code)
• Training
– Free:
• FedVTE Ex: Software Assurance Executive Course (SAE) 
• SAFECode
• Secure Coding and Standards Tutorial (NASA Only)
– Paid: (Ex: Cigitial, Pluralsight)
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Applies to all SW 
development!! 
Not just ground 
systems
Not Baking in Security
Ex: Actual Ground Software
• Insecure random number 
generator was used to generate 
passphrases that control access to 
VPNs and other network 
resources
• Could enable someone to monitor 
or interfere with a system and be 
undetectable
– If this code was deployed with 
weak symmetric keys, the 
supposedly "secure" data-links 
between these devices would be 
vulnerable to a "man-in-the-
middle" attack.
• There were several instances 
throughout the code
– Klockwork discovered these 
during static code analysis
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Resource Describing Math.random: 
http://franklinta.com/2014/08/31/predicting-
the-next-math-random-in-java
Not Baking in Security
Ex: Actual Ground Software
• Code calls a generic exception handler
– Typically is done when a developer assumes 
they can only get known types of exceptions
– However, depending on the source of the 
exception (input stream for example) someone 
can try to cause a different exception resulting 
in unpredictable behavior (i.e. DoS)
– Also with a ground system, you want to fail-fast
• Catching and ignoring fatal exceptions makes a program 
less robust since it will try to carry on as if nothing 
happened in the worst of conditions
• Immediately report at its interface any failure
• Don't pretend like nothing happened, because it's going 
to get worse
• Klockwork discovered these during static code 
analysis
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Not Baking in Security
Ex: Actual Ground Software
• Lacking the appropriate code in a finally block (java exception handling)
– Using something and then call a close, doesn’t mean it will actually close if an 
exception is encountered either in the use or the close call
– A finally block helps assure proper closure and deallocation
– This can be for any type of resources (file, database, etc.)
• Resource leak could use up all resources, causing the system to become 
unresponsive after excessive or continued use, reducing dependability 
(i.e. DoS)
• Klockwork discovered these during static code analysis
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Low Hanging Fruit
Unsafe Functions
• Stop using known unsafe functions and always do bounds checking 
if you are copying to a buffer
– Even if you think you know what you are copying from and it’s limited, 
defensive coding is best.
• Some samples of unsafe functions due to allowed writing with no 
regard to buffer size
• Most of these are unsafe due to allowed writing with no regard to 
buffer size
– strncpy, _iota, sscanf, & wcslen have safer _s varieties (ex. _iota_s) 
that require a buffer size to be specified
• Resource: Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls
• Resource: Stack Overflow Post
• Free tool to help find unsafe functions - Flawfinder
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memset
memcpy
strcat
strcmp
strcpy
strlen
sprintf
strncpy
_iota
sscanf
wcslen
Demo
• Demo Flawfinder
20
Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules
• For legacy code:
– MSC00-C. Compile cleanly at high warning levels
• The process of fixing compiler warnings will probably 
quash some other vulnerabilities.
– ERR33-C. Detect and handle standard library 
errors
• Include any program functions that give some kind of 
error indication
– If a function returns some special value on error, such as 
NULL, your calls to that function should always check its 
return value
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Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules (cont.)
• For new code
– ERR00-C. Adopt and implement a consistent and comprehensive error-handling policy
• This is where programs fail the most easily. They fail to check for errors because the developers 
don't know what to do if an unexpected error occurs.
– MEM00-C. Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of 
abstraction
• A design issue, but not following it will get your code into hot water quickly.
– MEM12-C. Consider using a goto chain when leaving a function on error when using and 
releasing resources
• More specifically, make sure your code frees resources even if errors occur.
• For both new and existing code: execute static code analysis 
tools to determine weaknesses
• Free ones are a good place to start; See slide 14 for commercial ones
22
– Cppcheck 
– Rosecheckers
– Splint
– Find Bugs
– RATS
– Flawfinder
– SWAMP
Info from DHS
CWE:
• Serves as a common language 
for describing software security 
weaknesses in architecture, 
design, or code
• Provides a:
– Standard measuring stick for 
software security tools targeting 
these weaknesses
– Common baseline standard for 
weakness identification, 
mitigation, and prevention efforts
• Utilize CWE to better 
understand, identify, fix, and 
prevent weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities
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CAPEC:
• Community-developed list of common attack 
patterns
• Comprehensive schema and classification 
taxonomy
• International in scope
CVE:
• Identifies publicly known information 
security vulnerabilities and assign them a 
CVE_ID. 
• Scored 1 to 10 on CVSS scale
Services sponsored by Department of Homeland Security and managed by Mitre
Taking into account attack pattern and any other factors to generate list of CWEs that are 
critical. Tools report findings in CVEs (known) and CWEs (potential) -> Identify then Fix!
CWEs & Ground Systems
• For NASA, research & analysis has been performed by the IV&V Program to 
identify the Top 25 CWEs for Ground Systems
• The following categories are part of the formula for CWSS
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Attack Surface Sub-score Environmental Sub-scoreBase Finding Sub-score
Ranking
Each factor in the category is 
assigned a value. These values 
are converted to associated 
weights and a category sub-
score is calculated. The three 
sub-scores are multiplied 
together, which produces a 
Common Weakness Scoring 
System (CWSS) score. Higher the 
score, higher it ranks.
Top 25 CWEs
Ground Systems v2.0
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Rank CWE ID CWE Title
1 312 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
2 88 Argument Injection or Modification
3 77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used 
in a Command ('Command Injection')
4 23 Relative Path Traversal
5 73 External Control of File Name or Path
6 798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
7 353 Missing Support for Integrity Check
8 732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical 
Resource
9 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a 
Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
10 78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used 
in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
11 290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
12 20 Improper Input Validation
Rank CWE
ID
CWE Title
13 403 Exposure of File Descriptor to Unintended Control Sphere 
('File Descriptor Leak')
14 314 Cleartext Storage in the Registry
15 835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
16 833 Deadlock
17 764 Multiple Locks of a Critical Resource
18 421 Race Condition During Access to Alternate Channel
19 119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a 
Memory Buffer
20 318 Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information in Executable
21 242 Use of Inherently Dangerous Function
22 497 Exposure of System Data to an Unauthorized Control Sphere
23 772 Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
24 681 Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
25 192 Integer Coercion Error
Rankings are 
currently under 
peer review. 
Version 2.0 of Top 
25 now includes 
Common Attack 
Patterns
Demo
• Demo Fortify w/ CWE Reporting
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Origin Analysis:
Secure SW Supply Chain
• From Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)  SOAR Report – “Origin analyzers 
are tools that analyze source code, bytecode, or binary code to determine 
their origins (e.g., pedigree and version).”
• Origin Analysis can be used to reduce the software supply chain risk
– Identifies CVEs that may be present in re-used open source libraries/code
– Also identifies potentially licensing issues
• Examples of tools
– Sonatype
• Binary scanner; Works best on JAVA
– Black Duck HUB 
• Provides binary and source tree scanning; Support C/C++ as well has JAVA
– OWASP Dependency Check
• Currently Java, .NET, Ruby, Node.js, and Python projects are supported; additionally, limited 
support for C/C++ projects is available for projects using CMake or autoconf.
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Examples from Ground 
Systems
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Vulnerability Affected File Mitigation
CVE-2014-0003: Allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary Java
methods via a crafted message.
camel-core-
1.5.4.0-fuse.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 2.11.4 or newer
CVE-2009-4611: Allow remote
attackers to modify a window's
title, or possibly execute arbitrary
commands or overwrite files, via an
HTTP request
jetty-6.1.14.jar;
jetty-util-
6.1.14.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 6.1.25 or newer
CVE-2011-2730: Allows remote
attackers to obtain sensitive
information
spring-web-
2.5.5.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 3.2.9 or newer
CVE-2014-0107: Allows remote
attackers to bypass expected
restrictions and load arbitrary
classes or access external resources
via a crafted messages
xsltc.jar;
xalan.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer
CVE-2013-4002: Allows remote
attackers to affect availability via
unknown vectors.
Xerces2.6.2_xer
cesImpl.jar;
xercesImpl.jar
N/A (new versions exist but also
contain vulnerabilities).
Implement host based restrictions
(i.e., IP tables, file integrity
detection, Host based IDS)
CVE-2010-1244: Allows remote
attackers to hijack the
authentication of unspecified
victims
activemq-web-
5.2.0.2-fuse.jar
Upgrade Jar file to 5.9.0 or newer
Demo
• Demonstrate Sonatype
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Example: Heartbleed
What is it?
• OpenSSL is an open-source implementation of the SSL and TLS protocols. 
The core library, written in the C programming language, implements the 
basic cryptographic functions and provides various utility functions. 
Wrappers allowing the use of the OpenSSL library in a variety of computer 
languages are available.
• Its free!
• As of 2014 two thirds of all webservers use it.
• From Heartbeat to Heartbleed
– Defect could be used to reveal up to 64 kilobytes of the application's 
memory with every heartbeat
– The affected versions of OpenSSL allocate a memory buffer for the 
message to be returned based on the length field in the requesting 
message, without regard to the size of actual payload in that message.
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Reference:  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed)
Reference:  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed)
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Example: Heartbleed
How does it work?
Example: Heartbleed
How do I find it?
• One way to find it would be to execute Origin Analyzer across source 
tree that includes your open source code as well 
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Demo
• Demonstrate BlackDuck Hub
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• It is difficult to determine what types of tools and techniques 
exist for analyzing software, and where their use is appropriate. 
– Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) created the SOAR report and matrix to 
assist
• NASA has slight modified version to include tool names <-> contact 
brandon.t.bailey@nasa.gov
– Ideally developers will institute static source code and binary analysis to assist 
in identifying weaknesses
• Development activities should include analyzing source code before it is compiled to 
detect coding errors, non-secure coding constructs, and other indicators of security 
vulnerabilities or weaknesses that are detectable at the source code level
– Developers should perform software evaluations throughout the software 
development lifecycle to address potential security vulnerabilities early in the 
process
– Use research from NSA’s CAS and Institute for Defense Analyses to establish a 
blend of tools that will provide the most value
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Finding Vulnerabilities in SW
Demo
• Demo SOAR Spreadsheet
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Break
• Tutorial E Part 1:
– Section 1: Cyber Threat – Who, What and Why
– Section 2: Defense-In-Depth
– Section 3: Secure Software Engineering Steps
– Section 4: Errors, Weaknesses and Exploits
– Section 5: Threat Modeling
– Section 6: Testing
– Section 7: Resources
• Tutorial E Part 2:
– Section 1: Ground Systems Overview
– Section 2: Secure Software Development
– Section 3: Defense in Depth for Ground Systems
– Section 4: What Now?
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Defense in Depth (DiD)
• Secure software development is extremely important but DiD is key to 
protecting mission assets
• In Mission environments, DiD can be difficult
– Older architectures/technology
• Unsupported operating systems, older hardware, etc.
– Shared architectures/technology
• Mission X doesn’t own all layers of the defense
• Sometimes vulnerable software depends on something that is out of their 
control
– Do you trust the Network Engineers? Should you?
– Do you control the host level configuration?
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Compounding Problem
• Work with Network Engineers to implement enclaves/network 
zoning and/or encryption
– Build a “zero trust” architecture 
• Vulnerabilities injected by Mission X may affect Mission Y
– Network layer encryption
• Understand and eliminate pivot points
– From networking perspective, software security perspective, host level 
security
• Increase attack depth or eliminate all together
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Utilize tools like RedSeal Networks, Skybox, etc. to 
understand network topology and threat exposures
Example SW Impacting Mission
39
Exploits Custom S/W
Establishes persistent 
foothold on Mission 
Asset 
Mission 
Asset
Signs onto Rogue Wifi,
Click Phishing Link, Etc.
Then Signs onto VPN
Often Times F/W Rules 
Allow Access
Directly to Assets on 
Mission Networks
Mission
Control
Launch Attacks 
(DoS, Brute Force, 
Extract Data, etc.)
This example will depict how vulnerable software within a 
network can potentially impact critical mission assets
Developers can’t assume protection from Firewall. Need 
“Defense in Depth”. Can’t assume if knocking on door, 
that they are supposed to be there.
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates that a pathway exists from the VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or Untrusted to a vulnerable piece of software
Vulnerable SW
VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or 
“Untrusted”
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates all outbound access paths (Pivoting) from the vulnerable asset
Vulnerable SW
Sample Exposure
42Demonstrates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited from this server
Vulnerable Asset
“Pivot Point”
Mission Control that 
“wasn’t” network 
accessible from VPN, 
Untrusted, Etc.
Attack Depth = 1
Defense in Depth (DiD) (cont.)
• Example depicted how vulnerable software in a network 
that doesn’t employ zero-trust architecture can expose 
mission assets
• Network encryption is another layer of defense that 
provides protection
– Protocol machinery below the Network Layer including the 
Network Layer protocol (e.g., IP, Data Link, Physical) is exposed
• Data Link Layer services can provide additional protection
– Upper-layer protocols become opaque
– Data Link Layer security may be useful when a threat 
assessment indicates a heightened risk of exposure of the 
underlying protocols across an RF link or when traffic analysis is 
a concern.
– Data link layer is usually under complete control of the Mission 
and vulnerabilities within the shared architecture can be 
mitigated by added this layer of defense
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Data Link Layer
• DiD: Network layer unsecure/non-encrypted or frame data is 
sensitive post network layer (i.e. RF)
• Secure at data link layer
– Data Link Layer security services may be able to provide all of the mission’s 
security needs, which could include authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality, but only on the specific link over which the security services 
are provided.
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Secure Environment
Space-Link
Extension
Protocol
Space
Link
?
• Without protection:
 Spacecraft are vulnerable to spoofing 
attacks from rogue ground stations
 Telemetry could be received and processed 
by rogue ground stations
 …
TC
Forging
TM
Eaves=
dropping
Securing Space Data Link: 
Space-Link Threat Analysis
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• CCSDS realized that a standardized protocol to integrate 
security into space missions with a simple network topology 
could be proposed at the data-link layer
 Space Data-Link Layer Security Protocol (SDLS)
• Space Data Link Security (SDLS) Blue Book Published 
September 2015
• Protections implemented via software!
CCSDS Space-Link Security 
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SDLS Capabilities
SCC/MCC
G/S
P/L TM User
Space Packet 
Protocol
SCPS-NP
TC Synch and
channel coding
TM Synch and
channel coding
RF and Modulations Systems
Network Layer
Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
TC Space Data 
Link protocol
TM Space Data 
Link protocol
Secured TM/TC Protocol
AOS Space Data 
Link protocol
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SDLS in a Nutshell
• SDLS supports two main security services
1. Authentication only – providing authentication and integrity
2. Authenticated encryption – Adding confidentiality
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SDLS Baseline Mode
• To promote multi-mission implementations and interoperability:
 3 recommended profiles have been defined covering security requirements of most 
missions w.r.t. TC, TM and AOS links
• Baseline mode for TC
 Authentication only, using AES/CMAC, 128-bit key, 32-bit ARC, 128-bit MAC (22-
octet overhead (8%))
• Baseline mode for TM and AOS
 Authenticated encryption, using AES/GCM, 128-bit key, 96-bit initialization vector, 
no seq. # needed, 128-bit MAC (30-octet overhead (2.5%))
(bits)
INITIALIZATION 
VECTOR
SECURITY HEADER
0
SECURITY
PARAMETER
INDEX
16
PAD
LENGTH
0
SEQUENCE NUMBER
32
(bits)
INITIALIZATION VECTOR
SECURITY HEADER
96
SECURITY
PARAMETER
INDEX
16
PAD
LENGTH
0
SEQUENCE
NUMBER
0
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What To Do Now?
• In mission environments (esp. mission with extended ops) you 
may not be able to patch code; therefore for vulnerable code 
that can’t be fixed the “host” owner can
– Harden the servers and hosts by disabling all ports, 
protocols and services that are not explicitly required for 
operations
– Install file integrity software (i.e., TripWire, Aide) to alert to 
changes made to the file system
– Install and finely tune a host-based IDS that will alert to any 
anomalous traffic
– Utilize IP tables/IPFilters to limit data flow to specific IP 
addresses, ports, protocols and services
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What To Do Now?
• To prevent future deployments of vulnerable code
– Participate in secure code training
• Educate developers, PMs, Authorizing Officials, Security Personnel (ISSO, ISO, etc.) 
on the importance of eliminating vulnerable code from architecture
– Pick the low hanging fruit (see slides 20/21)
– Utilize Best Practices and Secure Coding Standards
• Ex: Best Practices from NASA’s Secure Coding Portal 
• Ex: Coding Standards (Ex. CERT C, C++ or JAVA Stds)
– Institute static source code and binary analysis to assist in identifying 
weaknesses - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis
• Apply the tools within the development activity (i.e., as an add-on to the developer's 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE)) as well as in the Independent Test and 
Evaluation (IT&E) activities
• Top 25 CWEs for Ground Systems
– Use NASA’s or create you own based on your mission and threats
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Help Assure 
Ground System Security
• Expand independent assessments of ground 
systems for vulnerabilities using latest 
technologies
– Perform “Red” and “Blue” Teams across the entire 
ground system – End to End
• Promote integration of security early in 
acquisition and development life-cycles
• Integrate cyber security activities to 
dependably Know, Prevent, Detect, Respond, 
and Recover
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Backup Slides
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Links
Slide 5/6:
• major space agencies of the world - http://public.ccsds.org/participation/member_agencies.aspx
• multi-national forum - http://cwe.ccsds.org/
Slide 11:
• Program Protection & System Security Engineering - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_pp-sse.html
• 2810 - http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_2810_001A_/N_PR_2810_001A_.pdf
• 7150.2B - http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_7150_002B_/N_PR_7150_002B_.pdf
• 7120.5E - https://foiaelibrary.gsfc.nasa.gov/_assets/doclibBidder/tech_docs/1. N_PR_7120_005E_.pdf
• 800-53 - http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
• SA-11 - https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/Rev4/control?controlName=SA-11
• RA-5 - https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/Rev4/control?controlName=RA-5
• Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) - http://www.cert.org/cybersecurity-engineering/products-services/square.cfm?
• Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
Slide 14:
• C - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
• C++ - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
• JAVA - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
• Klockwork - http://www.klocwork.com/products/insight
• Fortify - http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/software-security/
• Flexelint - http://www.gimpel.com/html/flex.htm
• CodeSonar - http://www.grammatech.com/codesonar
• Sonatype - http://www.sonatype.com/
• BlackDuck - https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
• Report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• Spreadsheet - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx
Slide 15:
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - https://cwe.mitre.org/
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) - https://cve.mitre.org/
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) - https://capec.mitre.org/
• FedVTE - https://fedvte.usalearning.gov/
• SAFECode - https://training.safecode.org/
• Secure Coding and Standards Tutorial - https://www.safaribooksonline.com/self-registration/nasatutorials/
• Cigitial - https://www.cigital.com/services/training/elearning/
• Pluralsight - https://www.pluralsight.com/search?q=security&categories=course
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Links (cont.)
Slide 16:
• http://franklinta.com/2014/08/31/predicting-the-next-math-random-in-java
Slide 19:
• Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls - https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb288454.aspx
• Stack Overflow Post - http://stackoverflow.com/questions/6747995/a-complete-list-of-unsafe-string-handling-functions-and-their-safer-
replacements
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/
Slide 22:
• Cppcheck - http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
• Rosecheckers - http://sourceforge.net/projects/rosecheckers/
• Splint - http://www.splint.org
• RATS - https://code.google.com/p/rough-auditing-tool-for-security
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder
• SWAMP - https://continuousassurance.org
• Find Bugs - http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
Slide 23:
• CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/
• CVE - https://cve.mitre.org/
• CAPEC - https://capec.mitre.org/
Slide 27:
• SOAR Report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• Sonatype - http://www.sonatype.com/
• Black Duck HUB - https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
• OWASP Dependency Check - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
Slide 30/31:
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed
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Slide 34:
• report - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
• matrix - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx
• NSA’s CAS - http://samate.nist.gov/docs/CAS_2011_SA_Tool_Method.pdf
• Institute for Defense Analyses - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-software-soar-mobility-Final-Full-Doc-20140716.pdf
Slide 46:
• Blue Book - http://public.ccsds.org/publications/archive/355x0b1.pdf
Slide 51:
• C - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
• C++ - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
• JAVA - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis
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1. Validate input. Validate input from all untrusted data sources. Proper input validation can eliminate the 
vast majority of software vulnerabilities. Be suspicious of most external data sources, including 
command line arguments, network interfaces, environmental variables, and user controlled files.
2. Heed compiler warnings. Compile code using the highest warning level available for your compiler and 
eliminate warnings by modifying the code.
3. Use Code Analysis Tools. Use static and dynamic analysis tools to detect and eliminate additional 
security flaws. Dynamic analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application during runtime. Static 
analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application by examining the code without executing the 
application. Many software defects that cause memory and threading errors can be detected both 
dynamically and statically. The two approaches are complementary because no single approach can find 
every error. The primary advantage of dynamic analysis: It reveals subtle defects or vulnerabilities 
whose cause is too complex to be discovered by static analysis. Dynamic analysis can play a role in 
security assurance, but its primary goal is finding and debugging errors. The primary advantage of static 
analysis: It examines all possible execution paths and variable values, not just those invoked during 
execution. Thus static analysis can reveal errors that may not manifest themselves until weeks, months 
or years after release. This aspect of static analysis is especially valuable in security assurance, because 
security attacks often exercise an application in unforeseen and untested ways.
4. Use Binary Analysis Tools. Binary analysis creates a behavioral model by analyzing an application's 
control and data flow through executable machine code – the way an attacker sees it. Unlike source 
code tools, this approach accurately detects issues in the core application and extends coverage to 
vulnerabilities found in 3rd party libraries, pre-packaged components, and code introduced by compiler 
or platform specific interpretations.
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5. Architect and design for security policies. Create software architecture and design your software to implement 
and enforce security policies. For example, if your system requires different privileges at different times, 
consider dividing the system into distinct intercommunicating subsystems, each with an appropriate privilege 
set.
6. Keep it simple. Keep the design as simple and small as possible. Complex designs increase the likelihood that 
errors will be made in their implementation, configuration, and use. Additionally, the effort required to achieve 
an appropriate level of assurance increases dramatically as security mechanisms become more complex.
7. Default deny. Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This means that, by default, access is 
denied and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted.
8. Adhere to the principle of least privilege. Every process should execute with the least set of privileges 
necessary to complete the job. Any elevated permission should be held for a minimum time. This approach 
reduces the opportunities an attacker has to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
9. Sanitize data sent to other systems. Sanitize all data passed to complex subsystems such as command shells, 
relational databases, and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Attackers may be able to invoke unused 
functionality in these components through the use of SQL, command, or other injection attacks. This is not 
necessarily an input validation problem because the complex subsystem being invoked does not understand the 
context in which the call is made. Because the calling process understands the context, it is responsible for 
sanitizing the data before invoking the subsystem.
10. Practice defense in depth. Manage risk with multiple defensive strategies, so that if one layer of defense turns 
out to be inadequate, another layer of defense can prevent a security flaw from becoming an exploitable 
vulnerability and/or limit the consequences of a successful exploit. For example, combining secure 
programming techniques with secure runtime environments should reduce the likelihood that vulnerabilities 
remaining in the code at deployment time can be exploited in the operational environment.
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11. Use effective quality assurance techniques. Good quality assurance techniques can be effective in 
identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities. Fuzz testing, penetration testing, and source code audits 
should all be incorporated as part of an effective quality assurance program. Independent security 
reviews can lead to more secure systems. External reviewers bring an independent perspective; for 
example, in identifying and correcting invalid assumptions.
12. Adopt a secure coding standard. Develop and/or apply a secure coding standard for your target 
development language and platform.
13. Define security requirements. Identify and document security requirements early in the development 
life cycle and make sure that subsequent development artifacts are evaluated for compliance with those 
requirements. When security requirements are not defined, the security of the resulting system cannot 
be effectively evaluated.
14. Model threats. Use threat modeling to anticipate the threats to which the software will be subjected. 
Threat modeling involves identifying key assets, decomposing the application, identifying and 
categorizing the threats to each asset or component, rating the threats based on a risk ranking, and 
then developing threat mitigation strategies that are implemented in designs, code, and test cases.
15. Don't trust services. Many organizations utilize the processing capabilities of third party partners, who 
more than likely have differing security policies and posture than you. It is unlikely that you can 
influence or control any external third party, whether they are home users or major suppliers or 
partners. Therefore, implicit trust of externally run systems is not warranted. All external systems should 
be treated in a similar fashion.
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16. Separation of duties. A key fraud control is separation of duties. For example, someone who requests a 
computer cannot also sign for it, nor should they directly receive the computer. This prevents the user 
from requesting many computers, and claiming they never arrived. Certain roles have different levels of 
trust than normal users. In particular, administrators are different to normal users. In general, 
administrators should not be users of the application.
17. Software Supply Chain. IT managers should create and preserve a bill of materials, or a list of 
ingredients, for the components used in a given piece of software. The complexities and 
interdependencies of the IT ecosystem require software suppliers to not only be able to demonstrate 
the security of products they produce, but also evaluate the integrity of products they acquire and use. 
Ultimately this should lead to greater confidence through integrity checks incorporated in a defined 
secure development lifecycle.
18. Avoid security by obscurity. Security through obscurity is a weak security control, and nearly always 
fails when it is the only control. This is not to say that keeping secrets is a bad idea, it simply means that 
the security of key systems should not be reliant upon keeping details hidden. For example, the security 
of an application should not rely upon knowledge of the source code being kept secret. The security 
should rely upon many other factors, including reasonable password policies, defense in depth, business 
transaction limits, solid network architecture, and fraud and audit controls. A practical example is Linux. 
Linux's source code is widely available, and yet when properly secured, Linux is a hardy, secure and 
robust operating system.
19. Fix security issues correctly. Once a security issue has been identified, it is important to develop a test 
for it, and to understand the root cause of the issue. When design patterns are used, it is likely that the 
security issue is widespread amongst all code bases, so developing the right fix without introducing 
regressions is essential. 60Back
